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ABSTRACT 
Does regional decentralization threaten the commitment to regional equality in government 
outcomes? We attempt to shed light on this question by drawing on unique evidence from the 
largest European unitary states to have engaged in countrywide health system 
decentralization: Italy and Spain. We estimate, decompose, and run counterfactual analysis of 
regional inequality in government output (health expenditure per capita) and outcome (health 
system satisfaction) during the expansion of health care decentralization in both countries. 
We find no evidence of an increase in regional inequalities in outcomes and outputs in the 
examined period. Inequalities are accounted for by differences in health system design and 
management by regional governments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reforms involving the territorial reorganization of public services have become common 
over the past few decades across most European countries (Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions, 2013). Of all public policy responsibilities, the delivery of health 
care exhibits the most drastic power re-allocation to sub-national governments in European 
unitary states (Costa-Font and Greer, 2012)1. The motivation mostly lies in the need for 
government to be accountable to citizens with heterogeneous needs and preferences (Oates, 
1972)2. However, the decentralisation of publicly subsidized services such as health care 
raises the concern that it might exacerbate disparities in public sector activity, especially in  
contexts where equality of all citizens across the territory is firmly established at the 
constitutional level3.  
Federalist advocates tend to argue that the development of regional disparities following 
decentralization can be addressed by instruments to safeguard equity formally (such as 
equalisation grants), or informally (by promoting regional policy transfer and diffusion of 
institutional innovations). Still, such equalisation grants are only designed to compensate for 
differences in fiscal capacity rather than for differences in outputs (or outcomes), which are 
the result of the autonomous management of resources by sub-national entities.  Interestingly, 
in a manner similar to that of federal states, unitary states engaging in health care 
                                                          
1 This movement may be counterproductive if health care delivery has large economies of scale and uniform 
needs and preferences. However, both limited-scale economies and heterogeneity in needs and preferences offer 
scope for welfare improvements from a tighter organization of authority and preferences. 
2 However, it is possible to identify other motivations alongside wider economic objectives (e.g., Weingast, 
2009). 
3 That said, many do not question that uniformly run services might generate important regional disparities too, 
which might be of an even larger magnitude. The latter is possbible because regional disparities in public sector 
activity such as health care activity may result from differences in the clinical practices of physicians working in 
a specific location as well as intended regulations and organisational structures (Skinner and Fisher, 1997), all of 
which stems from the management of resources at the local level.  
 
decentralization allow a significant degree of regional autonomy in setting differences in how 
health care providers compete and are funded, with some limits defined by framework 
regulation4. To mimick federal states and make regional governments more accountable, 
regional  funding comes both partly from equalization grants, and partly from transferred 
taxes on which subnational governments have some degree of autonomy. Italy and Spain 
would be examples of this institutional arrangements.  
Both in Italy and Spain, health care is the main policy responsibility of regional governments 
and accounts for almost half of the total regional budgets. Like in federal states, the central 
government defines mandatory services to be provided across all regions in framework laws, 
and funding is partly decentralized by the assignment of a share of national taxes and of new 
taxes to be managed at the local level (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006b).. The level of autonomy 
is comparable to most federal state and a recent OECD study positions Spain as topping (with 
Sweden) the European Uunion (EU) fiscal autonomy ranking, where also Italy ranks at the 
higher end.5 Clearly, since health care is autonomously (both politically and fiscally) 
managed by regional governments, differences in outputs and outcomes can emerge from 
different regional priorities as well as tax decisions. This is the case, above and beyond the 
effect of centrally set equalization grants which compensate some regions for differences in 
fiscal capacity, simply for differences in the management and the design of the local health 
systems, which ultimately depends on the quality of regional governments.  
                                                          
4 By ‘federal state’ we refer here to the constitutional definition of the state rather than the actual political and 
fiscal dynamics of the countries under study. Both Italy and Spain share some of the classical features of federal 
states.  
5 According to OECD (2016), in 2011 the sub-central tax revenue share of total tax revenue was 32.7% in Spain, 
15.9% in Italy, against 35.7% in Sweden (the top in the EU). The corresponding figures for 1995 were 13.3%, 
5,4% and 30.9%. As discussed below, the remarkable increase in decentralization experienced in both Italy and 
Spain is not limited to tax decentralization, but involved other dimensions, and was ratified at the Constitutional 
level. 
Nonetheless, existing literature examining the effect of decentralization on regional 
inequalities is ambiguous. Giannoni and Hitris (2002) find evidence that decentralization has 
increased the diversity of regional expenditure per capita in Italy which is typically attributed 
to the diversity that autonomy allows. In contrast, Zhong (2010) concludes that regional 
decentralization in Canada has reduced inter-provincial inequalities while it has increased 
intra-regional differences in utilization. Similarly, studies examining health care activity 
(Quadrado et al., 2001) and outputs and outcomes (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006) find a 
reduction of regional inequalities following the first wave of regional devolution in Spain. 
Hence, it is an empirical question whether a territorially decentralized provision of public 
services influences pre-existing regional inequalities. This is a critical question in the 
territorial design of public services, and is particularly important in unitary states where long-
lasting disparities are deemed to be defeating the mission of a national health service (‘equal 
service for equal need’). However, limited empirical evidence has been gathered on this 
subject. Most of the evidence is based on single-country analysis, and thus, the role played by 
country-specific institutional settings remains unclear. The present paper attempts to 
contribute to the literature in several ways. 
 
First, we examine the patterns of regional inequalities in the two largest European unitary 
states that have decentralized the health system throughout their territory, namely Italy and 
Spain. Evidence on the effect of decentralisation on regional equality to date refers to one 
country alone. The advantage of drawing from data from more than one country is that it 
allows for cross-country counterfactual analysis and improves the generalizability and the 
external validity of the results.  
Second, we specifically take advantage of the fact that the original decentralization design 
has been subject to two comparable processes of reform.6 Indeed, both Italy and Spain7 are 
unitary states exhibiting similar institutional designs (e.g., tax-funded health care, similar 
decentralization and number of regional units, framework laws, unitary state structures, and 
funding equalization mechanisms).Our empirical strategy follows a before-and-after 
methodology to examine the prevailing longitudinal regional inequality patterns in outputs 
and outcomes in both Italian and Spanish regions from 1998 to 2009, a period in which a 
second wave of decentralization took place. The second wave of descentralisation was of 
course more important in Spain, as in the latter encompassed the extension of responsabilities 
to health services which previously were centrally run.  
Third, given that government decentralization can influence both the way users access health 
care and several dimensions of quality of care and output, but not necessarily health 
outcomes directly (e.g., mortality), we concentrate on examining the effect on outputs (using 
unadjusted per capita spending) and a health care process related dimension of quality 
sensitive to health policy reform .8 Given that decentralisation entails that regional 
incumbents needs to be re-elected, we believe it is an especially sensitive variable to 
examine. We control for regional differences in fiscal capacity (proxied by income per capita 
at the regional level) and health care needs (measured by the share of people over 65 years of 
age). Finally, the paper contributes by employing a set of outcome and empirical strategies 
that extends previous research. 
                                                          
6 Both Italy and Spain have gone through two specific waves of decentralization: a first wave around 1980 
(1978 in Italy, and 1981 in Spain), and the second wave two decades later around 2000 (1999 in Italy, and 2002 
in Spain). 
7 In the United Kingdom (at the time of the study), devolution has only affected Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland, while England has remained centrally managed. In contrast, Italy and Spain exhibited a countrywide 
devolution in the second wave examined here.  
8 The effects of such processes can be captured in an overall health system satisfaction evaluation that is 
sensitive to changes in service quality in advanced economies (Blendon et al., 1990; Footman et al., 2013). 
 One outstanding question is whether territorial decentralization is actually driving patterns of 
regional inequalities in comparison with other potential drivers. To attempt to shed some 
light to such question, we consider a number of tests on standard inequality indices and we 
perform a regression-based (Oaxaca–Blinder) decomposition analysis to understand how 
much the observed inequality can be explained by decentralization alone. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the institutional 
background of the two examined countries. Section 3 describes the data used and the 
empirical strategy. Section 4 sets out the results, and Section 5 discusses conclusions. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Decentralization and regional inequalities in government activity 
Decentralization (also called devolution) as we refer to here entails the re-allocation of 
central government responsibilities to sub-central institutions; typically, it implies the re-
assignment of regional or local autonomy. The main mechanism through which 
decentralization can influence governance is by strengthening both political and fiscal 
accountability. Thus, to study the mechanisms through which decentralization can influence 
regional inequalities in government activity, political and fiscal accountability need to be 
examined together.  
Political accountability, in the form of regional (legislative) autonomy, is deemed to 
increase the probability of health reforms (Chernichovsky, 1995), government spending, and 
redistribution (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2011). However, such autonomy is usually 
exercised within the limits imposed by framework legislation, naturally limiting potential 
diversity in public service provision in federal states. On the other hand, if regional autonomy 
is reflected in regional-specific needs and preferences, the spatial distribution of resources 
should mirror such preferences, which would increase diversity in outputs.9 Nonetheless, 
even without the framework law limits to diversity, diversity can be reduced if there are 
incentives for policy transfer. Hence, the overall longer term effects on inequalities over time 
are ambiguous (Besley and Kudamatsi, 2006; Kang et al., 2012), and call for empirical 
scrutiny. 
From a fiscal standpoint, decentralizing public service funding (e.g., tax base and 
rate), adds to regional autonomy an additional dimension. And even if it only refers to 
handful of taxes, it hould alter the balance between political and funding responsibility, and 
expand fiscal accountability. This would activate constituents’ incentives to ‘vote-with-their-
feet’ (Oates, 1972), and to strengthen their control on government activity (so-called 
‘political agency’). Both, ought to improve governance and reduce undesired disparities 
(Breton, 1996; Weingast, 2009). In contrast, if decentralization fails to produce the political 
incentives to improve public services in some regions, and fails to engage people in regional 
mobility, then one would observe an expansion of differences across regions.  
Another explanation for the emergence of spatial differences lies in the effects of 
differences in economic development, which may limit the potential for fiscal accountability 
effects to be fully exercised. Decentralization is likely to benefit regions that already have a 
higher fiscal base from which to extract government resources. This would be expected to 
exacerbate disparities across regional health services. For example, in the context of the 
United States, Skinner and Fisher (1997) argue that a federally (centrally) organized 
Medicare leads to wide disparities in medical spending per capita, which persist after 
                                                          
9 Sen (1999) notes that no famines occur in countries where there are regular elections and a free press. 
Epidemiological research into the social determinants of health indicates that being subordinate to authority can 
have detrimental effects on mental and physical health (Marmot, 2004). 
adjusting by age, gender, price, and illness-related factors. In other words, an increasing 
efficiency of some states in delivering health care may come at the expense of higher 
disparities in health outcomes.  
Federalist designs all  include the role of equalization grants to correct for differences 
in initial disposable resources, but this is not without controversy. Recently, Kessler et al. 
(2011) challenged this view by drawing on the logic of a policy innovation and diffusion 
paradigm. They suggest that equalization grants in a federation give rise to interregional 
income inequalities that could not persist otherwise because of migration. In addition, they 
show that, although equalization grants in federal countries can actually contribute to 
equalize resources, equality of resources does not necessarily lead to equality of services if 
the quality of local governments (and their efficiency in providing the services) is 
heterogeneous across a country. This may be defined as the ‘equalization grants paradox’ in 
interregional transfer payments. Hence, whether the latter takes place or not is an empirical 
question.  
A subtler explanation for the emergence of inequalities across regions results from the 
presence of policy  interdependence. If decentralisation brings transparency (Beland and 
Lacours, 2010), then some regional health services are likely to innovate by adopting 
successful policies, but it takes some time, and possibly political incentives, for the remaining 
regions to emulate the frontrunner. If an institutional design allows for some competition 
across jurisdictions, a common standard may be reached informally, which would reduce 
regional differences. This would be reinforced by the presence of laws imposing minimum 
common standards across jurisdictions. Some empirical literature challenges this view by 
considering different cross-country measures of equality and different countries (e.g., in 
terms of income: Costa-Font and Rico, 2006; Costa-Font, 2010; Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2010; Sorens, 2014). 
Finally, an additional explanation for the development of regional inequalities in 
government activity lies in the loss of political influence for poorer regions in the allocation 
of federal funds, resulting in fewer resources being available at the local level. Whether this 
is the case or not depends on the political dynamics of each country, as well as the population 
of relatively poorer regions which explain some central-level resistance to further 
decentralization. If certain (poorer) regions were already well represented in central-level 
institutions, then decentralization - by scattering decision-making power - may weaken the 
leverage of those regions that would as a result experience a loss of influence. 
One limitation of the existing literature is that evidence on the spatial effects of health 
care decentralization is mostly limited to single-country analysis and thus has limited external 
validity. The present paper attempts to overcome this type of limitation by extending the 
analysis to two comparable country experiences of health care decentralization, as described 
in the next section.  
 
Decentralized unitary states: Italy and Spain 
The institutional default in Italy and Spain is comparable. Both countries are unitary states, 
and thus the authority that the regions hold comes directly from the central state. Italy has 
been a unitary state since 1861, but regional governments have existed since only 1970. 
Similarly, Spain has been a unitary state, with only two republican periods in 1873 and 1931, 
during which attempts were made to create a federal and regional governments, respectively. 
However, unlike in the United Kingdom, devolution in Italy and Spain did not follow a 
‘historic nation’ approach to create ‘federacies’, and instead was inspired by a ‘system of 
regions’ model whereby all regions were required to be responsible for health care. Perhaps 
the main difference between Italy and Spain is the initial asymmetries of Spanish 
decentralization until 2002 when health care responsibilities were transferred to all 
autonomous communities.10 The exceptions are Navarra and the Basque Country in Spain,11 
which have special fiscal status, and the special status of some Italian regions. Both countries 
have undertaken a comparable regional decentralization process where legislative autonomy 
is somewhat limited by framework legislation, and where fiscal autonomy is limited by the 
desire of the central government to provide equal resources to equal need. 
In both countries, basic social services such as health care are tax funded with an 
explicit commitment to delivering health system equality in their health care legislation. The 
regional allocation of resources is in both countries based on comparable resource allocation 
formulas based on needs, which include equalization grants.12 Funding comes from resources 
collected regionally (either from regional own taxes or participation in state-wide taxes) and 
block transfers from the central government, counting equalization grants based generally on 
population and other criteria (including fiscal capacity, meaning that more funds from the 
                                                          
10 The first wave began with the transfer of health care responsibilities to Catalonia (completed in 1981), 
followed by Andalucia (1984), the Basque Country and Valencia (1988), Galicia and Navarra (1991), and ended 
with the transfer of health care responsibilities to the Canary Islands (1994). A second wave followed that 
bridged the gap between the regions with health care responsibilities, and the 10 remaining regions were 
invested with the same level of health care responsibilities in 2002. This will help identify two sub-periods in 
the process of consolidating decentralization in Spain. 
11 For example, article 117 of the Italian Constitution assigns to the Central State the exclusive right to only 
‘define the Essential Levels of Services linked to civil and social rights to be guaranteed in the whole country’. 
Health care services are of course included, so that only the central government can identify the mandatory level 
of care to be assured in all regions, and it has the exclusive right to define the framework legislation. 
12 Navarra and the Basque Country are two special regions with a specific funding system and have managed to 
claim their historical fiscal self-government rights. Unlike the other regions of Spain, they collect their taxes and 
transfer to the central government the estimated costs of centrally provided public services, with little 
contribution to the overall country redistribution. 
central government are directed toward poorer communities). General taxes were (and still 
are) collected by the central state and transferred to the regions using unadjusted block grants.  
Both Italy and Spain increased not only the degree of fiscal self-government after 
2001–2002, but the extent of political accountability as well which, in the case of Spain,  tops 
OECD fiscal autonomy index together with Sweden (OECD, 2016). In Italy, from 1993 to 
1997, the fiscal decentralization process received a boost with the attribution to regional 
governments of contributions for the National Health Service. However, it was only from 
1998 onwards that a regional tax on productive activities (IRAP) was created together with a 
regional surcharge on the Personal Income Tax.  Notice that both IRAP and the regional 
surcharge allowed some degree of fiscal autonomy to regions, at least in the former years 
after the introduction of the new tax. For instance, IRAP rate can be freely 
increased/decreased by regions from the nationally set rate of 4.25% by one percentage point. 
Increasing regional tax rates is compulsory since 2007, if the regional government is running 
a deficit. To ensure a certain degree of equality across the country, with the  constitutional 
reform in 2001, Italy established framework legislation to ensure that ‘essential levels of 
care’ were provided in all regions. But the same Constitutional reform was quintessential to 
clearly establish the role of regional governments in identifying the organization and 
management of health care among the functions to be assigned to regions, together with a 
system of own taxes, hence helping identifying two sub-periods in the consolidation process 
of decentralization in Italy. 
Similarly, in Spain, further fiscal accountability in 1992 introduced regional 
participation in income tax (15%), which by 2002 amounted to 33% of income tax and 40% 
of value added tax, 40% of alcohol, petrol and tobacco taxation and 100% of a tax on 
electricity although with some restrictions to raise the tax base and tax rate. For other taxes, 
however, like the inheritance tax, regions free to choose the tax rate, and in some cases set 
the tax rate to a neglibible figure (e.g., Madrid or Valencia in Spain). These trends are clear 
from Figure 1 and 2, representing the evolution of the share of central government revenue 
(expenditure, respectively) out of general government revenue (expenditure) in both Italy and 
Spain. Data are taken from the OECD Fiscal Decentralization Database and are commonly 
used indicators in the literature (e.g., Sacchi and Salotti, 2016); they clearly show decreasing 
trends, an evidence supporting the consolidation of the decentralization process in both 
countries. Of course, this reallocation of revenues between the Central and the Regional 
governments have had different effects in different regions, according to their tax bases, 
which are quite strongly correlated with their GDP.13 
Of all the policies that have been devolved, health care is the most comparable policy 
between countries and has the largest impact on the public budget.14 It represents about ¾ of 
the budget for Italian regions and 1/2 for Spanish ones. Health care is for the most part an 
undisputed regional government responsibility in both Italy and Spain, and only a small 
number of policy responsibilities are left to the central states (e.g., drug price setting and 
international health).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here] 
 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Rationalizing regional inequalities 
                                                          
13 In Italy in 2009, for instance, 54% of health care funding was provided by the Central government when 
measured at the national level. The corresponding figure was 43% in the richest regions of the North, and 80% 
in the poorest Southern regions. See Turati (2012). Similary, in Spain in contrast, the central government only 
funds 3% of all health care spending, which varies between 1%-5% depending on the region.  
14 Education is another important policy, which is however decentralized in Spain but only in a couple of 
regions in Italy. See Turati et al. (2016) for a comparison of the two countries on this issue. 
In this section, we examine the main hypothesis of the paper, namely whether government 
territorial decentralization influences regional inequalities and their potential triggers. Thus, 
we examine whether inequality in one dimension is related to inequality in a different (but 
interrelated) domain, based on the premise that resources are allocated (and equalized) by the 
central government, but are eventually spent and managed by regional governments. The 
starting point is to examine whether the equalization of funding – and thus of resources 
available to each regional government via equalization grants and own revenues following 
decentralization – necessarily implies equalization of output, considering that health care 
activity (OUTPUT) results from the use of health care inputs (RESOURCES). We can define 
a simple function for this as follows: 
OUTPUT=f(RESOURCES, Xf)                                            (1) 
where X is a set of controls that may affect how resources are translated into outputs by each 
regional government (we avoid additional subscripts for simplicity purposes). In turn, we also 
attempt to measure a simple relationship for the empirical question of whether output 
equalization implies equalization of outcomes as follows: 
OUTCOMES=g(OUTPUT, Xg)                                           (2) 
This relationship captures the idea that health care activity will produce some 
outcomes in dimensions that can be measured after a reasonable period of time. This is 
referred to below as the quality of services. 
Decentralization enters our empirical specification via resources and constraints for 
each local government: the amount of resources is conditioned by the equalization role 
played by central government, both before and after decentralization; the composition of 
resources in terms of own revenues versus transfers from the centre is affected both by the 
degree of fiscal decentralization and the availability of the tax base at the local level. 
However, the operationalization of our specified measures is as follows. First, we collected 
data for Italian and Spanish regions over the years 1998–2009 from the Ministry of Health 
and the National Institute of Statistics of both countries. The period examined is, as explained 
in Section 2.2, one during which significant processes of reform took place, leading to the 
consolidation of fiscal decentralization in Italy and Spain (second wave of health care 
decentralization), as testified by the decrease in the share of central government revenue and 
spending in Figure 1 and 2. We have examined subsamples of regions for Spain and Italy, but 
given the potential for interregional mobility, especially between neighbouring jurisdiction, 
and the lower precision when subsamples of small regions are examined, we do not exclude 
any region from the main analysis. This strategy produces conservative estimates as it would 
change inequality estimate upwards in the event of devolution increasing regional 
inequalities.  
 
Alongside a series of records on regional characteristics that may influence either outcomes 
or outputs, we focus on examining two main variables of interest: health care spending per 
capita (HEXP, which we consider as a proxy for outputs, according to Atkinson, 2005) and 
the quality of services (QUAL, the share of people very satisfied with medical care, which we 
take as a proxy for procedural outcomes). The strategy we follow here is aimed at measuring 
the variation in the degree of inequality in these two domains before and after the 
consolidation of decentralization. We draw on a well-established empirical strategy based on 
the use of concentration indices and coefficients of variation to measure inequality and an 
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition methodology to decompose its determinants and run 
counterfactual estimates. 
 
Evaluating regional inequalities 
To measure regional inequality in both countries, we begin by estimating the Gini 
concentration index. Specifically, following O’Donnell et al. (2008), we first rank regions 
according to their per capita GDP (a measure of fiscal capacity, and thus of a higher fiscal 
autonomy following the consolidation of fiscal decentralization) and compute the Gini 
concentration index for both HEXP and QUAL, pooling all the years before decentralization 
and after decentralization, and then separately for the two sub-periods. We then test whether 
the Gini index is statistically significantly different from zero, to understand whether 
inequality is present and, if it is, to what degree in both domains. Following similar steps, we 
then compute the coefficients of variation for each year on both HEXP and QUAL and test 
whether average coefficients of variation are different before and after decentralization. We 
also consider for this exercise two additional variables as measures for fiscal capacity and 
needs. 
Finally, we better characterize the observed trends in inequality by considering an Oaxaca–
Blinder decomposition. Let =E(QUALb|X)-E(QUALa|X) be the difference in conditional 
means of the outcome variable QUAL comparing before (b) and after (a) decentralization. 
Thus, =[E(Xb)ꞌb]-[E(Xa)ꞌa] can be decomposed as: 
=[E(Xb)-E(Xa)]ꞌa +E(Xa)[b-a]+[E(Xb)-E(Xa)][b-a]                (3) 
where the first of the three terms represents the differences in ‘endowments’ (X), namely the 
determinants of QUAL, mainly health care spending; the second term represents the 
differences in the coefficients (), namely the way in which health spending is transformed 
into outcome before and after decentralization; and the final term represents the interactions 
between the two differences, accounting for the fact that differences in both endowments and 
coefficients exist simultaneously before and after decentralization (e.g., Jann, 2008, for more 
technical details). We test two specifications: the first one includes in X the variable HEXP 
only; in the second one, we augment this baseline specification with the share of people over 
65 years of age (OVER65, as a measure of greater health care needs), the per capita GDP 
(GDP, as a measure of fiscal capacity), and a dummy picking up the political alignment 
between regional and central government (ALIGNMENT), because this may influence the 
amount of available resources and spending (see, e.g., for the Italian case: Bordignon and 
Turati, 2009; Piacenza and Turati, 2014). 
As a further exercise, we also consider a counterfactual analysis, exploiting the 
differences in decentralization patterns between the two countries. The basic idea behind this 
exercise is to understand whether the differences in outcomes between Italy and Spain are 
explained by observable characteristics (the ‘endowments’) or by coefficients (which maps 
how observed characteristics are translated into outcomes by regional governments in the two 
countries). Let =E(YSpa)-E(YIta)=[E(XSpa)ꞌSpa]-[E(XIta)ꞌIta]; again, this can be decomposed 
as: 
=[E(XSpa)-E(XIta)]ꞌIta +E(XIta)[Spa-Ita]+[E(XSpa)-E(XIta)] [Spa-Ita]             (4) 
where the three terms are defined as before and allow us to attribute the difference in 
outcome to the difference in ‘endowments’ between the two countries (i.e., the observed 
characteristics of Italian and Spanish regions in terms of spending per capita, but also 
political alignment and fiscal capacity); the difference in the way resources are transformed 
into outcomes in the two countries (which will capture the institutional differences in the 
regional health care systems, including the quality of regional governments); and the residual 
interactions between these two terms. As before, we consider the simplest specification first, 
considering only HEXP in X, and then add further controls. 
Table A1 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics for all the variables considered 
in the analysis. Average HEXP is approximately 500 euros higher in Italy than in Spain, 
although the difference in per capita income is approximately 3000 euros. The share of 
people over 65 years of age is also larger in Italy than in Spain by approximately 2%, as is 
the share of people very satisfied with received medical care. 
 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analysis 
To begin with, we test the correlation between outcomes and outputs by regressing measures 
of (process-related) quality of services on health care spending per capita. A positive and 
significant correlation is found between the two variables: 0.004 for Spain (10% significance 
level) and 0.008 for Italy (1% significance level), indicating that, as expected, inequality in 
outputs may give rise to inequality in process-related outcomes. 
 
Inequality estimates 
Next, to test for the presence of regional inequalities, we first estimate the Gini concentration 
index, following the methodology described in, for example, O’Donnell et al. (2008), by 
ranking regions according to their per capita GDP. Table 1 shows the Gini index for both 
health system satisfaction (QUAL) and unadjusted output (HEXP) for Spain (upper panel) 
and Italy (lower panel) for all the years, and separately for the sub-period 1998–2002(2001), 
which denotes before the ‘second decentralization wave’, and the sub-period 2003(2002)–
2009, which denotes the post-decentralization wave. 
All the Gini coefficients are significantly different from zero except for the procedural 
outcome measure relating to the 1998–2002 period in Spain (the end of the first wave of 
health care decentralization). This exception can be explained by the fact that during this 
period a large number of policy innovations in some regions were extended to the rest of the 
country (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006). Thus, the results show some evidence of inequality in 
both dimensions, which is however limited in magnitude. The patterns of these inequality 
indices indicate significant persistence across the two sub-periods, but are markedly different 
in both overall dimension estimates across both countries. Specifically, considering the whole 
period, Italian regions are slightly less unequal than Spanish ones in terms of spending. These 
estimates include Italian autonomous regions and all the Spanish regions (i.e., Navarra and 
the Basque Country) that hold higher fiscal accountability than the rest. Given that these 
regions are relatively affluent, they have more resources to invest in health care. However, in 
both countries, after the consolidation of decentralization at the beginning of the 2000s, we 
observe the same level of inequality, which is suggestive of a decline in regional inequalities 
in output after devolution, consistent with the findings of Costa-Font and Rico (2006).  
Nonetheless, when we turn to examining inequalities in outcomes, we find 
inequalities in process-related outcomes (health system satisfaction) to be not significantly 
affected by devolution for Italy, while Table 1 reveals some differences across Spanish 
regions only after 2002. Thus, different patterns are observed across the two countries with 
respect to inequality in the two domains (i.e., outputs and outcomes) following the impact on 
resources stemming from decentralization. However, whether these patterns result from a 
decentralization design is a question that we examine further below.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
To better understand the evolution in inequality, we compute coefficients of variation 
for the two countries in each year on the two domains (quality and spending). The advantage 
of the coefficient of variation is that it is a simple way to compare datasets with different 
means and particularly suited to our study. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the two 
coefficients for all the examined years. We formally test whether mean values of coefficients 
of variation are different before/after decentralization with a standard t-test. The upper panel 
of Table 2 shows the results, which confirm the different patterns discussed above. As in 
Spain, inequality in quality decreased (t-test significant at the 10% level), despite an increase 
in inequality in spending (t-test significant at the 1% level) experienced in the first years after 
devolution (in particular in 2007), but it actually declined over time. Thus, decentralization 
decreased inequality in outcomes, despite increasing – at least in the short run – differences 
in spending. In the case of Italy, inequality in spending actually decreased after 
decentralization (t-test significant at the 1% level), but inequality in quality did not vary 
significantly; thus, decentralization reduced differences in spending, but not in outcomes. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
We also extend the analysis of the trends in inequality to two additional domains, 
namely fiscal capacity (proxied by per capita GDP) and needs (proxied by the share of people 
over 65 years of age). The lower panel of Table 2 shows these results. After decentralization, 
both countries experienced a decrease in inequality in fiscal capacities (t-test significant at the 
1% level in both countries), which was larger for Spanish regions; thus, convergence has 
been more rapid for Spanish regions in terms of per capita GDP. In contrast, we find two 
divergent patterns of inequality in needs, which increase in Italy and decrease in Spain: 
Italian regions are becoming more diverse in terms of needs, but this is not greatly reflected 
in the divergence of spending per capita. The opposite occurs for Spanish regions. Figure 3 
reproduces this evidence and shows similar long-term patterns for both the coefficient of 
variation of health expenditure and health system satisfaction, despite year-specific deviation 
such as in 2005. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Inequality decompositions 
However, one potential concern is that patterns of inequality may not necessarily result from 
the expected mechanisms. To further understand the effect of these different mechanisms, we 
take advantage of a standard Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition methodology, which allows us 
to attribute the difference in QUAL to three different components: the determinants of the 
procedural outcome, the way in which these determinants map in the outcome before and 
after decentralization, and the interactions between the two differences (e.g., O’Donnell et al., 
2008).  
Table 3 shows the estimates relative to the two model specifications discussed in 
Section 3.2 for both countries: column I assumes only HEXP in the set of determinants; 
whereas column II expands the set of controls by adding fiscal capacity (GDP), need 
(OVER65), and ALIGNMENT. Overall, the results are consistent across the two 
specifications: coherently with the earlier findings (Table 2), differences in QUAL are not 
statistically significant. In contrast, differences in the determinants appear to be statistically 
significant and counterbalanced by differences in the coefficients (which are, however, 
significant only in the less rich specification). Average ‘endowments’ increased after 
decentralization, but coefficients  changed in the opposite direction, at least in the simplest 
specification. However, as some regions (both in Italy and Spain) historically enjoy a higher 
degree of autonomy, we re-run our exercises by excluding those from our sample. Results are 
in column III and IV. The previous pattern is basically unaffected for Italy, while for Spain 
differences in ‘endowments’ are no longer statistically significant. Thus, our results are 
consistent with the idea that the consolidation of federalism did appear to influence the way 
in which spending is actually transformed into the procedural outcome; but historical 
differences in the autonomy of regions does matter. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Counterfactual exercise 
Finally, we run a counterfactual exercise, comparing Italy and Spain and explaining 
differences in outcomes across the two countries, again using an Oaxaca decomposition 
strategy. Table 4 shows the results, where columns I and II again denote the same two 
specifications discussed in Section 4.3 on the overall sample, while columns III and IV report 
the same exercise on a reduced sample, obtained by excluding regions historically 
characterized by a higher autonomy. Importantly, these results appear to be consistent across 
specifications and across different samples: differences in procedural outcomes (statistically 
significant across Italy and Spain) appear to be more explained by differences in the 
coefficients (namely the way in which Spanish and Italian regions transform outputs into 
outcomes) than by differences in the observed determinants of outcomes (from spending to 
fiscal capacity and needs). 
Overall, our results indicate some important differences across the countries in the 
evolution of regional inequalities that can be mainly explained, as expected, by differences in 
the institutional designs of the health systems. In particular, exploiting the different pattern of 
devolution across the two countries, also these results indicate that government 
decentralization consistently did not increase regional inequality in outputs and outcomes. A 
crucial role is likely to be played by the quality of regional governments, captured here by the 
coefficients’ component of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
CONCLUSION 
Of all public services, health care has been the most commonly decentralized responsibility 
to regional governments in Europe, and stands as the main and growing share of their 
budgets.  That is, in the past decades we have envisaged a progresive re-allocation of health  
system  authority to the regions, as well as fiscal responsibilities. However, in unitary states, 
such reforms may pose some concerns insofar as they are perceived to dismantle the 
principles of equality (uniformity) on which their health systems  are based. Whether 
decentralization does expand regional inequalities in health care systems performance is an 
empirical question and the main aim of this paper. 
This paper has taken advantage of unique data from the experience of Italy and Spain 
of health care decentralization, to understand the effect of decentralized government on 
outputs and outcomes. Specifically, we have examined whether decentralization has led to 
regional imbalances in either health care activity or outcomes. To do this, we measured 
regional inequalities in outcomes and process-related outcomes and employed a regression-
based decomposition strategy to decompose them. 
The results provide us with unique evidence to evaluate the performance of regional 
decentralization. Italy and Spain are the only two European countries to examine insofar as 
they exhibit  comparable health care system designs and have devolved health care authority 
to their respective regions in a comparable fashion in the same period of time. Some other 
contextual factors are also comparable and common, except for historical legacies that are 
country-specific. We find no evidence that expansion of inequalities took place after 
decentralization on both health outcomes and resources available to the regions. This finding 
is consistent with evidence from Spain and Canada (Costa-Font and Rico, 2006a; Costa-Font, 
2010; Zhong, 2010, Costa-Font and Moscone, 2008). The inequality indices are different 
from zero, but when examining trends in inequalities in outcomes, we find a declining 
inequality after the consolidation and deepening of decentralization processes. Although 
inequality is found to be persistent before and after decentralization, inequality patterns are 
different across the countries. Italian regions are slightly less unequal than Spanish ones in 
terms of spending (even including autonomous regions). However, inequality indices have 
dropped in both countries and are found to be comparably similar (not statistically different 
in the second period examined). In contrast, Italian regions are more unequal in terms of 
(process) outcomes, and decentralization reduced differences in spending, but not in process-
related outcomes. 
Possible explanations for these limited regional inequalities include the development 
of framework laws and the role of equalization funds that limit the expansion of diversity of 
outputs. However, a more powerful explanation is based on the potential effect that 
decentralization exerts on incentives for policy innovation and diffusion. These incentives 
apply to both Italy and Spain, because some regional governments play the role of 
frontrunner in devising new programmes that are subsequently adopted in other regions. 
Thus, organizational advantages of some regions exert positive external effects on other 
regions. 
To conclude, from a policy standpoint, processes of health care decentralization in 
unitary states are unlikely to be a concern for regional cohesion in the context of European 
unitary states so long as the design promotes competition and policy innovation, and 
equalisation mechanisms and framework regulation do not exert unintended effects. The 
challenge lies in how to maintain a balance between incentivizing policy innovation and 
diffusion without hampering spatial cohesion, a challenge which call for a specific attention 
to the quality of sub-national governments in charge of managing resources at the local level. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of central government revenue out of total general government revenue 
(1998-2009) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of central government expenditure out of total general government 
expenditure (1998-2009) 
 
 
 Tab. 1. Inequality in resources and outcomes (Gini index) 
Spain 
 
All yrs. 1998-2002 2003-2009 
Quality (‘Health system satisfaction’) 
 
0.034* 0.019 
 
0.062** 
  
[0.018] [0.029] 
 
[0.023] 
Output (‘Public spending per capita’) 
 
0.093*** 0.031*** 
 
0.026*** 
  
[0.009] [0.008] 
 
[0.009] 
Italy 
 
All yrs. 1998-2001 2002-2009 
Quality (‘Health system satisfaction’) 
 
0.147*** 0.146*** 
 
0.157*** 
  
[0.009] [0.015] 
 
[0.012] 
Output (‘Public spending per capita’) 
 
0.057*** 0.047*** 
 
0.028*** 
  
[0.006] [0.007] 
 
[0.005] 
Note: This table reports the Gini index of health systems satisfaction (Quality) and unadjusted output (spending 
per capita) across regions in Spain (upper panel) and Italy (lower panel) for the whole period examined 1998-
2009 in column one. Columns two and three provide the Gini for the subperiods 1998-2002(2001) which refer 
to before as the ‘second decentralization wave’ and the period 2003(2002)-2009 which refer to post 
decentralization wave. SE in square brackets. Sig. lev.: *** 1%, **5%, * 10%.  
 
 
Table 2. Trends in inequality 
 
Quality (satisfaction) 
 
Health Spending p.c. 
 
before after Diff 
 
before after diff 
        Spain 0.468 0.456 -0.011* 
 
0.079 0.090 0.011*** 
   
(0.007) 
   
(0.002) 
        Italy 0.339 0.344 0.005 
 
0.086 0.077 -0.009*** 
   
(0.005) 
   
(0.001) 
 
Fiscal capacity 
 
Needs 
 
before after Diff 
 
before after diff 
        Spain 0.214 0.193 -0.021*** 
 
0.180 0.198 -0.018*** 
   
(0.0007) 
   
(0.0008) 
        Italy 0.253 0.248 -0.006*** 
 
0.168 0.134 0.034*** 
   
(0.0006) 
   
(0.001) 
Note: This table reports the means of the coefficient of variation in the period before 
decentralization (1998-2002(2001)) and in the period after (2002(2003)-2009), together with the t-
test for the difference in means. We measure four different variables: health system satisfaction, 
health spending per capita, fiscal capacity proxied by GDP per capita and need proxied by 
population over 65. SE in parentheses. Sig. lev. t-test on diff.: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
 
 Figure 3. Evolution of coefficient of variation for quality and health spending 
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  Table 3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Y: quality)    
Variables Italy Spain  
 
I II III IV I II III IV  
Yb 35.93*** 35.93*** 34.207*** 34.207*** 24.15*** 24.52*** 25.42*** 25.42***  
 
(1.354) (1.361) (1.414) (1.425) (0.998) (1.242) (1.581) (1.619)  
Ya 36.66*** 36.23*** 34.901*** 34.157*** 24.40*** 24.40*** 26.37*** 26.37***  
 
(1.001) (1.183) (1.033) (1.212) (1.012) (1.021) (1.290) (1.316)  
Difference Yb-Ya -0.726 -0.292 -0.695 0.050 -0.255 0.111 -0.945 -0.945  
 
(1.684) (1.804) (1.751) (1.871) (1.421) (1.607) (2.041) (2.088)  
Endowments -8.227*** -5.012** -4.466* -4.812** -5.544** -5.121** -2.586 -2.289  
 
(2.395) (2.295) (2.525) (2.380) (2.460) (2.203) (2.939) (3.341)  
Coefficients 13.64*** 2.418 8.555* 2.838 10.83** 3.715 4.673 2.566  
 
(4.375) (2.979) (5.002) (3.237) (4.294) (5.733) (7.775) (7.252)  
Interaction -6.136 2.303 -4.783 2.025 -5.541 1.517 -3.032 -1.222  
 
(4.718) (3.312) (5.335) (3.582) (4.747) (5.927) (8.060) (7.777)  
Observations 240 200 180 150 238 204 120 120  
Note: This table reports an Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the conditional means of quality (health system satisfaction) before and after 
decentralisation. Col. I: controls include only spending per capita. Col. II: controls include spending per capita, GDP pc, share people over65, alignment. 
Col. III and IV report the same exercises in Col. I and II on a reduced sample excluding some regions with a higher degree of autonomy (Valle d’Aosta, 
Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicilia and Sardegna for Italy; Catalunia, Andalucia, Valencia, Basque Country, Navarra, Galicia and 
Canary Islands for Spain). SE in parentheses. Sig. lev.: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Comparing Italy and Spain (Y: quality)   
Variables I II III IV 
Yspa 24.28*** 24.45*** 25.97*** 25.98*** 
 
(0.708) (0.781) (0.993) (1.004) 
Yita 36.42*** 36.11*** 34.669*** 34.177*** 
 
(0.803) (0.889) (0.830) (0.916) 
Difference Yspa-Yita -12.14*** -11.66*** -8.694*** -8.201*** 
 
(1.070) (1.183) (1.294) (1.359) 
Endowments -4.114*** -1.333 -2.038* -0.236 
 
(1.296) (1.161) (1.125) (1.388) 
Coefficients -9.942*** -7.837*** -7.338*** -11.232*** 
 
(1.534) (1.358) (1.842) (2.544) 
Interaction 1.915 -2.488* 0.682 3.267 
 
(1.696) (1.398) (1.725) (2.636) 
Observations 478 404 300 270 
Note: This table reports an Oaxaca Blinder decomposition of the conditional means of quality for Italy compared to Spain. Col. 
I: controls include only spending per capita. Col. II: controls include spending per capita, GDP pc, share people over65, 
alignment. Col. III and IV report the same exercises in Col. I and II on a reduced sample excluding some regions with a higher 
degree of autonomy (Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicilia and Sardegna for Italy; Catalunia, 
Andalucia, Valencia, Basque Country, Navarra, Galicia and Canary Islands for Spain). SE in parentheses. Sig. lev.: *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
Spain 
Health 
Spending pc 238 991.74 313.78 485.50 1883.52 
Quality 238 24.28 10.90 4.80 58.69 
GDP pc 238 18309.81 5275.38 7614.00 31496.00 
SharePop65 204 17.89 3.40 11.04 24.60 
Alignment 204 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
Italy 
Health 
Spending pc 240 1488.13 306.66 876.00 2246.00 
Quality 240 36.42 12.41 13.82 66.70 
GDP pc 200 21962.22 5783.30 11449.00 33558.00 
Share_pop65 240 19.84 2.84 13.31 26.80 
Alignment 240 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Note: This tables provides the number of observations, mean and standard deviation of the main 
variables of the study.  
 
 
